# Round 5

## 1AC

### Case

**The monopoly on anti-trust policies in debate is whiteness itself and its entanglement with liberal regimes of reformism recreate settlerism. Redistributive projects are implicated in this regime – the topic is a project of white futurity that democratizes the right to determine “good” and “bad” competition through the continual writing out of native and black modes of being.**

**Boxell 21** [Mark, received his PhD in history from the University of Oklahoma. His current book project is tentatively titled Red Soil, White Oil: Petroleum and White Supremacy in the Progressive-Era United States, “From Native Sovereignty to an Oilman’s State: Land, Race, and Petroleum in Indian Territory and Oklahoma,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (2021), 20, 216–233, doi:10.1017/S1537781420000808//ak47]

In 1907, two geology professors, G.E. Condra and Charles N. Gould, published an informational tract in the Bulletin of the American Geographical Society touting Indian Territory’s prospects as a destination for industrious white settlers. Included in “Opening of the Indian Territory” was a narrative on the territory’s burgeoning petroleum industry, which Condra and Gould predicted would continue to grow. They lamented how the collective system of land tenure practiced by the territory’s Indigenous nations and “Government control” (a reference to federal restrictions) had retarded oil prospecting. However, in the authors’ eyes the allotment of Indian land into individual properties was quickly solving that problem; indeed, on the verge of statehood, Indian Territory contained thousands of oil wells and a “nearly continuous line of derricks,” seventy-five miles in length, that extended from southern Kansas to Tulsa. Condra and Gould’s interest in oil was perhaps predictable given their backgrounds in the infant science of geology. But their guide to Indian Territory was just as invested in explaining the region’s racial makeup. The two white authors noted the differences they saw between “full-blood,” “mixedblood,” and “quarter-breed” Indians; indicated that Cherokees had for years readily mixed with whites, while Creeks tended to marry into Black families; and insisted that white civilization was bound to overtake this mixed-race world. “The white man is to rule,” they stated, “and the problem of the Indian is largely solved in his amalgamation.” It had been the “destiny” of Indigenous people to “give [their] blood and a few strong traits” to white society, but to otherwise disappear. Meanwhile, “The negro is to remain a problem in social, educational, and industrial matters.” It was from this “cosmopolitan body” that the “crucible of civilization is to reduce a citizenship” in Indian Territory.1 Over the following two decades, establishing the white man’s citizenry that Condra and Gould envisioned turned out to be heavily rooted in funneling the streams of wealth that flowed from petroleum into the hands and pockets of whites, despite Indian Territory and Oklahoma’s status as a region of widespread Indigenous, African Indian, and African American landownership. The practices that allowed white people to remove oil wealth from Native and Black pockets were the product of **a racialized mineral regime founded upon the settler principle that non-whites were especially incapable of self-governance** in a world of petroleum abundance. This principle was baked into the settler-colonial policy of allotting collectively held tribal land into privately owned homesteads. As part of this process, white lawmakers and officials prevented newly-minted Indian landowners from alienating their allotments and mandated that white guardians oversee the leasing of land for oil production. Likewise, the State of Oklahoma required that white guardians oversee oil-rich allotments owned by Black citizens of the state’s Indian nations. While such rules ostensibly “protected” Indigenous and Black Indigenous landowners from losing their property, they provided a legal path through which white settlers seized Native property, squandered Black and Indigenous wealth, and forced Indians and other peoples of color off of the most desirable pieces of oil land.2 **Allotment was a federally backed scheme to educate Natives in the traditions of economic individualism and cultural liberalism, to force Indigenous peoples to, as one historian puts it, learn the “whitening culture of capitalism.”** However, the potential of great mineral wealth in Indian Territory destabilized this social-engineering project, which was built on the assumption that large swaths of land of relatively equal value could be easily divided among tribal citizens. Contrary to this, oil abundance offered a handful of “full-blood” Indians and African Natives unimaginable riches through the tapping of dormant petroleum resources, which undermined white reformers’ goals of transforming Native people into yeoman farmers and wage workers.3 For lawmakers, federal agents, and local officials and business owners, this threat to the reformative ethos of allotment helped justify white control of Natives’ oil inheritance. Oil booms threatened to equip people of color with social and economic power just as whites worked to define and instill a racial hierarchy that achieved the opposite. It became imperative for whites to closely manage Indigenous and Black petroleum property, not only as a means of expanding the former’s material possessions, but also as an avenue through which social difference could be more broadly policed and white sovereignty achieved. Despite this, Indigenous and African Indigenous individuals used settler institutions, such as state and county courts, to defend their right to oil-rich property and to leverage the racialized property regime that assumed their incompetence to their advantage.4 White settlers claimed hydrocarbons for themselves not only by appealing to racialized notions of “competence” rooted in the assumption that non-whites could not grasp the value of fossil-fuel energy. They also drew upon fears that **white enterprises were constantly under the threat of domination by “outside” monopolies to argue that petroleum and the lands it resided beneath must be controlled by “local” whites.** In both instances, white settlers struggled to reckon with how petroleum altered distributions of wealth and property. Oil booms enriched non-white individuals while leaving many white people in possession of worthless land and under the economic thumb of monopolistic oil corporations. This only further encouraged the development of an oil-field culture that dismissed non-white communities as rightful claimants to “black gold” while elevating the righteousness of small-scale, settler-owned enterprises. Borrowing from the historian Timothy Mitchell, the conflicts over racial identity, property rights, and distributions of wealth that rankled white people’s claims over Indian- and Black-owned oil land amounted to the “engineering [of] political relations out of flows of energy.”5 In Indian Territory and Oklahoma, this energy politics often resulted in **carbon despotism**, as petroleum abundance encouraged undercapitalized white oilmen to embrace **a politics that fused white supremacy and anti-monopolism and drove broad resistance to nonwhite wealth and sovereignty.** The latter not only resulted in myriad individual attacks on people of color, but, as we will see in the conclusion, also contributed to one of the United States’ worst race massacres on record.6 Native Sovereignty, the Politics of Monopoly, and the Discovery of Oil in Indian Territory Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, crude oil’s place in the economy, ecology, and culture of Indian Territory transitioned from the low-impact use of petroleum as a health product, to the Anglo-American-led establishment of high intensity drilling ventures aimed at securing one of nature’s densest forms of energy. The earliest petroleum-centric enterprises in Indian Territory had been tribally-owned health resorts that marketed oil springs as rehabilitative. In 1853, a federal Indian agent stationed in the Choctaw Nation reported on such a spring, writing, “[t]he oil springs in this region are attracting considerable attention, as they are said to be a remedy for all chronic diseases … The fact is that it cures anything that has been tried.” Gardner Tubby, an African Choctaw man, worked at a tribally owned health resort where he labored among springs black with oil and collected petroleum-laden sands that guests used as a salve to treat “boils, cuts, bruises and other afflictions of the human body.” The business thrived for ten or fifteen years, beginning in 1881, and Tubby recalled that “[t]he sick and afflicted would come from far and near, camp and drink and bathe in the water from these springs.” Native people and settlers across North America had long utilized oil seeps and other naturally-occurring petroleum springs for medicinal purposes. Skimmed from water sources by human hands and applied to the body, this method of use in many ways contradicted the industrial extraction of petroleum that white Americans developed beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, oil’s centrality to energy systems was only one chapter in its history as a utilitarian substance. Nevertheless, the geologic circumstances that brought oil to the surface in the form of springs also beckoned those whose interest lay in petroleum’s combustibility.7 The first discoveries of extractable deposits of oil in Indian Territory vexed Native governments, federal officials, and oil companies, as the rights of non-Native prospectors and enterprises in Indian Territory remained ill-defined. In 1859, Lewis Ross, the brother of Cherokee Chief John Ross, accidentally discovered a small oil pool near Grand Saline in the Cherokee Nation while mining for salt. Ross’s find occurred the same year that drillers in western Pennsylvania sank the first profitable oil wells in the United States. In the years following the Cherokee man’s discovery, a handful of white oil drillers traveled to Indian Territory to sink exploratory “wildcat” wells. These oilmen met formidable obstacles in their efforts to create a viable petroleum industry. For one, Indian Territory remained geographically isolated from petroleum markets and largely bereft of the industrial materiel and concentrated capital that successful drilling ventures required. Furthermore, in the late nineteenth century, it remained unclear to oil prospectors and Indian nations alike just how federal policy would govern mineral extraction. The Five “Civilized” Tribes (the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole Nations) barred white people from citizenship and restricted landownership to intermarried whites, but retained little power when it came to negotiating leases with outside companies. When white prospectors did enter Indian Territory, federal officials tended to insist that these U.S. citizens cease operations and leave the Native nations.8 By the end of the nineteenth century, the conflicts that arose around the leasing of land for oil production conjoined with the politics of allotment, which **combined race-based defenses of private property and anti-monopolism in calling for the dissolution of communal tribal land bases.** In the eyes of allotment’s supporters, Native nations ultimately could not be incorporated into the United States because they were uncommitted to the establishment of private-property relations. In short, as the anthropologist and historian Patrick Wolfe writes, in the eyes of many white Americans, “Indians were the first communist menace.” Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts chaired the Dawes Commission, which was established in 1893 to lead negotiations with the Five Tribes and achieve the transformation of their communally held lands into individually owned homesteads. Dawes and other white “Indian theorists” of the time demanded allotment based upon a moral and ethical defense of individually-held private property. Dawes described Native people’s communal land regimes as “Henry George’s system,” understanding common property not as a long-standing tenet of Indigenous culture and nationhood, but in Euro-American terms that equated communalism with single taxers, Marxists, and other radical leftists. He lamented that, with Indigenous property relations, “There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization.” **The Dawes Commission and its supporters also viewed allotment as a means to fight monopoly.** Allotment would, in theory, redistribute land controlled by a consolidated minority of “mixed bloods,” or those Natives considered “whiter” than others—usually by a combination of white familial ties and a commitment to market relations—to the majority “full bloods,” those individuals considered furthest from racial and cultural whiteness. In hopes of socially reengineering “full bloods” into whiter subjects, the commission placed restrictions on the sale of individual Indians’ allotments based on blood quantum, which was established through often unreliable surveys. The more Native “blood” the state deemed an individual to have, the longer that Indigenous person was required to hold onto their land and, in the process, absorb the nuances of white yeoman culture and the rules of private property.9 Indian Territory’s Indigenous nations proved especially opposed to allotment. In the early nineteenth century the Five Tribes had been exemplars of self-directed adaptation to white civilization, adopting Anglo-American-style governmental institutions prior to their forced march westward from the southeastern United States to Indian Territory. However, by the late nineteenth century, these nations represented allotment’s strongest detractors. White officials grew convinced that the tribal nations in Indian Territory would never voluntarily give up their communal land base. When Congress passed the 1898 Curtis Bill, which created the final framework for the Five Tribes’ allotment, a Cherokee man voiced misgivings that other Indigenous peoples shared, sardonically writing, “there will be oil leases, asphalt leases, gold leases, stone leases, marble leases, granite leases, air leases, and possibly the very blessed light of the sun (should it prove capitalizable) may be captured and monopolized by some shrewd speculator under one of Charlie Curtis’ wonderful lease-traps.” While Native opposition was often fierce, the leadership among the Five Tribes begrudgingly accepted allotment, understanding that recalcitrance would end with the forced breakup of their collective land bases at the hands of the United States.10 Indian leaders tasked with navigating allotment and the ongoing prospecting and leasing of their land looked to petroleum resources as a means to maintaining a semblance of collectivism. Principle Chief Pleasant Porter of the Creek Nation regretted the discovery of oil on Creek land made by white and “mixed-blood” drillers in the summer of 1901. Porter feared that the oil finds, which occurred near a tiny cattle town called Tulsa, would complicate the allotment process, making land that was previously worthless from an agricultural standpoint suddenly desired by whites and Indians alike. He believed that allottees should seek out a home and livelihood on tracts that had a “normal use as agricultural lands,” while oil land should be declared surplus and proceeds from it distributed for the benefit of “every citizen of the [Creek] Nation.” Such a regime was not unheard of. The Osage Nation retained collective mineral rights and distributed royalties from oil production through such a system. However, Porter’s call for the nationalization of petroleum would not be realized among the Five Tribes. Indian allottees, through the oversight of local, state, and federal officials, would sign leases and earn royalties from oil as individual landowners. These conditions not only met **the Dawes Commission’s conception of allotment as a mediated introduction of Indians to white people’s market economy, but also fit the notion that Indians’ communal holdings were in fact monopolies controlled by nefarious outsiders**, and that the preservation of any collectivist property relations would disintegrate into the same.11 The idea that **only white-settler enterprising could thwart monopoly power** also painted demands for more liberalized leasing and oil-production rules on Native-owned land. Seymour Riddle, a white attorney representing the United Commercial Clubs of the Indian Territory before a Senate committee in 1906, ridiculed federal rules that barred oilmen from selling their leases for profit and required lessees to prove that they held enough cash to develop a lease. “No individual or corporation without a vast amount of money can comply with these rules and the result is that only the very wealthy individuals and corporations of unlimited means have been able to secure the approval of very many oil and gas leases.” Riddle’s allusion to “corporations of unlimited means” was a veiled reference to Standard Oil, which smaller wildcat prospectors assumed was ever poised to dominate Indian Territory’s emerging petroleum fields. Riddle and other oil and gas developers hinged their arguments against federal rules on what often appeared esoteric, such as the requirement that drillers secure a bond that would insure their lease in case of a failed operation. However, such questions struck at the core of allotment, white settlement, and oil development: How should property be administered, and to whose ultimate interest? For Riddle and many other white oilmen—especially small independents— **restrictions on the alienation of Indian property were “wrong on principle” and violated “business rule,” and thus must be eradicated, lest Standard and other monopolists prey on supposedly naïve Indigenous property holders and dominate markets in land and oil to the detriment of white settlers and their families.**12 For these independent oilmen, race, minerals, and land were intertwined. **Only a property regime established on the basis of small-scale white enterprise could thwart the wasteful monopolism of land and minerals by way of both large “outside” oil companies and federally protected, backward Indigenous landowners.** Before the same Senate hearing, “Colonel” J.W. Zevely, a white man who represented the Muskogee Commercial Club, lambasted not only federal restrictions, but also the risk that Indians represented to the proper commercial use of oil and gas. Zevely objected to federal rules that required oil producers to pay Creek and Cherokee allottees $50 annually for unutilized gas wells. Race played into Zevely’s concerns. If a white oil producer abandoned a gas well, then control of the well reverted to the Indigenous allottee, “and he may not exercise the care that the lessee must preserve not to waste it.” Zevely was further angered when he could not obtain signatures on leasing papers without paying exorbitant bonuses to the individual Indian in question. And as prospecting for oil increased, so did the cost of bonuses. Zevely lamented the annoyance and out-of-pocket expenses this brought about and complained that “[a]n Indian may not know the value of his land, but just try to get a lease from him on some of his land, and you will see that he has a pretty good idea of what its value is— generally an inflated idea, though.” Ultimately, what angered Zevely most was that, in his view, the Department of the Interior unilaterally established the rules that governed how oilmen obtained access to Native land and minerals. He did not believe the federal government could exercise such close oversight of private enterprise. Zevely ended his statement by asserting that Congress “can’t pass laws that will protect a man against himself,” regardless of race.13 Ignoring men such as Pleasant Porter and the bonus demands of their own Indigenous lessors, Zevely and other white oilmen insisted that Indians could not grasp the value of petroleum nor conjure the capital and labor needed to pull it from the earth. If these and other white settlers understood the need for some mediation between settlers, the government, and Indigenous individuals in the realm of landownership, they rejected similar oversight of the subterranean world, despite the fact that the two were inextricably linked. **Ultimately, what Zevely and many of his white contemporaries in Indian Territory desired was their own state**, which would offer white businessmen the opportunity to form their own government **that could set the rules of the oil game and achieve the expansion and intensification of white sovereignty.** White men realized that dream in 1907 when Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory were fused to form the State of Oklahoma, just as the largest oil booms yet seen in the region—booms that disproportionately occurred on Native allotments—commenced. Mixed-Race Oil Fields in a White Man’s State The allotment of tribal land and the discovery of new oil fields accelerated during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1905, drillers again struck oil near Tulsa, opening the Glenn Pool field, the first large oil find in Indian Territory. The Texas Company (Texaco), Gulf Oil, and others built pipelines connecting the oil-producing area to refineries in Texas, Kansas, and the Chicago area. Tulsa quickly grew into a regional hub for the oil industry, becoming the home base for numerous banks, refineries, and oil-field service companies. The Glenn Pool field’s success meant the dreams and efforts of capitalists centered in New York City; skilled workers from the oil fields of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia; and farm families from across the beleaguered cotton and wheat fields of the South and West fixed upon the region’s oil prospects. Wildcatters continued to open modestly producing fields until 1912, when another massive oil find was made fifty miles west of Tulsa, near the town of Cushing in Creek and Payne counties. Cushing quickly grew into one of the world’s most prodigious oil fields. The crude that drilling companies extracted from the lands of the Creek Nation was of especially high grade, perfect for refinement into gasoline, the demand for which had exploded with rises in automobile use and continued to expand as World War I kicked off in Western Europe. Production in the field peaked in April of 1915 at over three hundred thousand barrels a day, which at the time represented more than two-thirds of the high-grade crude oil produced in the Western Hemisphere. Oil companies extracted more than forty-nine million barrels (2.6 billion gallons) in 1915, with drilling centered on an area only ten miles long and three miles wide. Thirty refineries operated in the town of Cushing throughout the boom period. The field was home to the largest complex of petroleum-storage tanks in the world, covering 160 acres and containing four hundred 55,000-barrel tanks, which altogether could hold up to sixty million barrels of crude.14 Not only was the Cushing field a prolific producer, it also was built on a mosaic of racially diverse leases made up of white, Black, Indigenous, and immigrant landowners. Native royalty owners were especially prevalent in the field—upwards of 40 percent of the oil leases in Cushing faced federal restrictions based on the Indigenous “blood” of the leasing landowner. Before oil was discovered around Cushing, federal officials had allotted much of the land to “full-blood” and African Creeks, who were more likely than “mixed bloods” to oppose allotment and less likely to request a specific tract of land during allotment proceedings. The Dawes Commission arbitrarily assigned 160 acres to each of these Creeks—land that was often the least desirable from an agricultural standpoint. Many of these allottees were “conservative” Creeks who demanded the reinstitution of the original treaties that ceded Indian Territory to the Five Tribes in perpetuity. These Creeks and other “full-blood” factions formed the intertribal Four Mothers Society, which in 1906 petitioned Congress to restore past treaties that guaranteed sovereignty and lands in common. These Natives not only demanded the end of allotment, but, like Pleasant Porter, also called for the communal sharing of oil and gas. African American and African Indigenous landowners were also common in the field, with many of the latter being citizens of the Creek Nation. Finally, a number of Syrian immigrants obtained oil fortunes on land they originally purchased due to the deception of white promoters, who purposefully misrepresented its agricultural value.15 While conservative Natives had no interest in recognizing the authority of white governments in the former Indian Territory, many Indigenous land and royalty owners in the Cushing field demanded rights as citizens based on their identities as lessors.16 During court proceedings, white officials, oilmen, and Native individuals labored to construct race as a legal and rhetorical concept, revealing how oil booms raised vexing questions about the rights of Native property holders to participate in the petroleum economy. The story of Thomas Gilcrease, one of a number of tribal citizens who became successful oilmen, reflected this process of race-making in the oil fields. Gilcrease was the son of a white man and a Creek woman, and as such, was assigned an allotment not far from Tulsa. Drillers sank forty-nine wells on Gilcrease’s land beginning in 1906, when he was still a minor, and these wells produced upwards of twenty-five thousand barrels per month. When the original lease was due to end in 1911, the twenty-one-year-old entered into a partnership with several investors in order to keep the rigs on his land running. However, Gilcrease eventually took his partners to court, likely either because he was in debt to one of the partners or because he had received better offers from other investors. In court, Gilcrease claimed that he was in fact incompetent, uneducated, and inexperienced in matters of business, and that as a result, the partnership should be dissolved. The defendants in the case argued that Gilcrease was in fact of “more than average intelligence,” and of “at least three years active successful experience in business.” They insisted that Gilcrease understood the oil industry—the costs and risks of drilling, as well as the laws that governed extraction. At a more fundamental level, they were proclaiming that Gilcrease was white. In effect, Gilcrease’s partners argued that the “mixed-blood” Creek man’s experience in the oil business established his identity as a white man, and thus he should not be subject to the paternalistic state and federal laws that limited the property rights of Native citizens. Gilcrease attempted to wield the legal precept of incompetency to his advantage, a strategy that “mixed-bloods” could use to obtain power within Oklahoma’s racial caste system.17 In other cases, individual Indians argued against their declared incompetency, which prevented them from direct access to the money that their oil wells produced. Martha Jackson was a “full-blood” Creek who, alongside dozens of Native and non-Native parties, claimed ownership of a Cushing-field allotment inherited from a late relative. The disputed piece of land was originally titled to Barney Thlocco, a “full-blood” Creek man who, along with numerous members of his immediate and extended family, died of an unclarified infectious-disease outbreak in January of 1899. The large number of sudden deaths within one family, and the lack of clarity over the order in which the Thloccos succumbed to the disease, made inheritance a murky question. Subsequently, there were at least 147 claimants to Thlocco’s estate, including Martha Jackson, who was Barney Thlocco’s stepdaughter and likely his nearest living relative. While many of these claims were fraudulent, many Creeks and other members of the Five Tribes maintained kin ties that could not be easily squared with Anglo-American legal tenets, which tied inheritance to nuclear families and direct “blood” relatives, which whites understood through the lens of race and skin color. The desire of white officials to manage Native land on terms acceptable to such property laws made conflicts over oil and inheritance that much more frequent and fraught.18 In 1914, an African Creek lawyer named J. Coody Johnson represented Martha, who was still a minor at the time, and her father, Saber Jackson, in court regarding the inherited allotment. In exchange for representation, Saber—who was still Martha’s legal guardian in 1914—agreed to lease part of the allotment to Johnson for the purpose of oil and gas drilling, and in collaboration with a handful of white partners, Johnson formed the Black Panther Oil and Gas Company. The Black Panther’s first well on the Thlocco allotment produced twelve thousand barrels per day, a colossal amount of oil, the daily value of which at the time was upwards of $10,000. Indeed, the Thlocco tract quickly became one of the country’s most valuable petroleum properties. Johnson used profits from the Black Panther to settle hundreds of competing claims for the allotment, allegedly paying out a total of $300,000 to Indian claimants. Subsequently, Martha and Saber Jackson accused Johnson of using his clout as a well-known lawyer and his “great influence” among the Creeks to declare Saber unfit to act as guardian of Martha’s now-wealthy estate. The Jacksons claimed that Johnson implored a judge to assign one of the Black Panther partners, a white man named R.W. Parmenter, to oversee Martha’s oil royalties. Johnson accused Saber Jackson of “drunkenness” and of “flirting and scheming” with regard to the allotment, and that such behavior made him unfit to manage his daughter’s affairs.19 Unlike Thomas Gilcrease, Jackson and her lawyers fought back against the notion that Martha and Saber were incompetent and incapable of administrating the oil estate. Before the supreme court of Oklahoma, Jackson’s lawyers contended that “designing and artful persons” desired to “cheat, defraud and rob” Martha of her estate and inheritance by making false claims before county judges regarding her “competence.” Martha Jackson further alleged that the Black Panther owners had defrauded her of $1.2 million over a span of four-plus years. The Jacksons’ efforts partially prevailed, but not before Martha suffered a typical form of settler-colonial violence. In May of 1919, just days before her eighteenth birthday and a subsequent court hearing on her competency, unknown assailants kidnapped Jackson from the Dwight Indian Training School in Seminole County. Oil companies operating in Oklahoma frequently kidnapped Indian lessors, especially minors, in hopes of forcibly securing a signature from the allottee. Thomas Gilcrease himself was alleged to have whisked a Creek boy on the verge of gaining his majority as far as London in hopes of garnering a lease. Such kidnappings represented a violent form of Indian removal that white officials did little to stop. Despite the kidnapping and Jackson’s subsequent absence from court, the county judge still declared her incompetent, arguing that Martha was well known to him and that the court had “full knowledge of [Jackson’s] mental capacity.” Martha Jackson survived her ordeal and eventually won $300,000 from Black Panther. However, this represented only a quarter of what she claimed to have lost.20 Black Panther’s Thlocco lease became further implicated in the problems of racial property when questions about oil monopolies and resource conservation arose around its production efforts. The protection of white petroleum businesses and the regulation of market-destroying flows of oil combined here **to form a white-supremacist oil-field politics** that elevated independents as the most-worthy white men in the oil game. During the early twentieth century, crises of overproduction and oil waste frequently gripped the Southwest’s petroleum region, as scores of individual producers raced to capture as much oil from flush fields as quickly as possible. The result was momentous amounts of wasted crude, which ran freely down creeks, rivers, gullies, and streets, plus the collapse of oil prices due to the glut of supply. The Cushing field buckled under such conditions by early 1915. Oil slicks frequently accumulated on the Cimarron River, a tributary of the Arkansas, which flowed adjacent to the Thlocco allotment. These slicks routinely caught fire, charring and blackening the river’s wooded shoreline. Economic problems accompanied the ecological fallout. Due to oversaturated markets, prices had plummeted from over a dollar a barrel to around forty cents in less than a year. At the same time, Black Panther’s Thlocco lease was considered by many to be the most productive oil land in the state, valued at $2 million, and a major contributor to the overproduction crisis. As a result, Johnson’s lease became the object of scrutiny for white oilmen and public officials. Whenever overproduction gripped a field, small producing companies bristled at the power of larger companies and alleged monopolies, such as Standard’s subsidiary Prairie Oil and Gas. These latter companies often controlled pipelines that connected smaller producers to refining markets and their large-scale capitalization allowed them to weather periods of low prices when independent producers could not. When the Oklahoma Corporation Commission attempted to protect smaller companies in the Cushing field by arbitrarily inflating the price of oil, the Standard subsidiary cited Black Panther as a company that willingly sold oil at basement prices and therefore stood as proof that there was no need to artificially raise rates. Cushing’s independents criticized Black Panther as “the recreant Cushing price cutter” and urged producers and oil-field workers to support the corporation commission’s restrictions on sales. These oilmen believed that the corporation commission was the only bulwark preventing “one man from ruining the business of a thousand” and wanted to prove to Black Panther’s African Creek owner that he “cannot monkey with the bread and butter of an entire industry without getting thrashed for it.”21 Beyond this kind of thinly-veiled racist language lobbed at the Black Panther company, it is difficult to say just how J. Coody Johnson’s status as a Black oilman may have played into the controversies surrounding the Thlocco lease. The oil tract was so productive that it was bound to draw the attention of the region’s oilmen and lawmakers regardless of the identity of the leasing company. However, **just as anti-monopolism had been invoked to support the dissolution of Native nations, the anti-monopolists who opposed Black Panther also often participated in early Oklahoma’s anti-Black white-supremacist movements.** The white men who owned small oil-producing outfits in Oklahoma tended to be members of the local upper classes, formally detached from distant sources of consolidated capital but still considerably wealthy in their own right. Many had been among the early white settlers in Indian Territory and insisted upon their worthiness as property owners and as social and political leaders vis-à-vis not only “outside” corporations but also non-white peoples, whether Indigenous, Black, or mixed race. This class of propertied white men had not only championed allotment, but had also led the establishment of Oklahoma as a Jim Crow state.22 **The combined interests of white nativism and oil-field anti-monopolism** were perhaps best reflected by Wash Hudson, a Tulsan and a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives. Amid the problem of collapsing prices, monopolistic pipelines, and overproduction in the Cushing field in 1915, Hudson coauthored a landmark oil conservation bill that bolstered the corporation commission’s power to set oil prices, strengthened common-carrier and common-purchaser laws in the state, and, in his words, represented “the only measure that has ever been proposed in any legislature that will have the effect of putting Standard Oil, the octopus of this country, on its knees to us.” Hudson’s bill passed, garnering support from numerous independent producers whose provincial, proprietary businesses he hoped to protect from outside corporate interests. **Hudson was also a founding member of the Tulsa branch of the Ku Klux Klan.** Alongside an oil-industry lawyer and a petroleum engineer, he was one of five original trustees of the Tulsa Benevolent Association (TBA), a corporation established in 1922 in the wake of the Tulsa race massacre that acted as a front for the newly-formed local chapter of the Klan. By 1923, the TBA had erected a three thousand-seat Klan headquarters known as “Be-No Hall,” as in “Be No Ni\_\_\_\_s, Jews, Catholics or Immigrants.” **Hudson’s advocacy for both antimonopoly in the oil fields and white supremacy in Tulsa reflected the desire of white men to use local avenues of influence to distribute capitalist power and extractive wealth on their own terms, through means both legal and extralegal.** Part of this strategy entailed mitigating the geological uncertainties of petroleum production by regulating drilling on independents’ terms, preventing flush oil-boom markets from destroying small-scale white enterprises. Of course, doing so meant contradicting the anti-regulatory rhetoric the same oilmen had used when eastern Oklahoma was Indian Territory. However, Hudson’s law was oil regulation enacted through the all-white, “local” state legislature that independents had always desired. White politicians such as Wash Hudson understood that regulating the flows of energy and money that coursed through the oil region was necessary for **protecting the power of independent oilmen, a project that fit nicely into a larger settler-colonial regime that sought the creation of white property through the control of both Indigenous- and Black-owned land and labor.**23 “The Richest Colored Girl in the World”: Oil (Mis)fortune on Sarah Rector’s Creek Nation Allotment The confluences of race and oil extended to the leasing of land owned by African Creeks, where the legal oversight of Indigenous citizens and Jim Crow-era whites’ assumptions about Blackness collided. Formerly-enslaved Black Creeks had been granted full citizenship in the Creek Nation as part of the tribe’s treaty with the U.S. government following the Civil War. As full tribal citizens, African Creeks received 160-acre allotments and were included on the tribal rolls, but because Black Creeks were defined as “freedmen” and not “Indians by blood,” the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did not claim jurisdiction over their allotments. However, county and state courts as well as the Creek Nation’s lawyers took a keen interest in how the allotments of Black Creeks were handled by the many oil companies vying for leases in the Cushing field. The most famous of these African Creek allottees was Sarah Rector, who was 10 years old when the Cushing boom commenced and whose oil-rich allotment quickly garnered her international fame as “The Richest Colored Girl in the World.” As a minor and, in the eyes of whites, a racially ambiguous lessor, she and her allotment came under special scrutiny.24 Controversy surrounding Sarah Rector’s land and oil wealth blew up in 1913 as the oil boom in Cushing grew, eliciting a series of investigations into Rector’s white guardian, the Prairie Oil and Gas Company, and the Rector family itself, all of which hinged on how race, property, and the vicissitudes of oil extraction interacted. Sarah and her mother (Rose), father (Joe), and five siblings lived in a small house with a single bed located near the all-Black town of Taft, situated along the Arkansas River southeast of Tulsa. Like many Creeks, Rector did not live on her allotment, which was located sixty miles to the west of Taft, just northeast of the boomtown of Oilton. Prairie Oil and Gas drilled fortynine producing wells on Rector’s allotment and during a five-month period in 1913 and 1914, the company paid Rector $46,000 in royalties. In addition to drilling for crude, Prairie extracted natural gas from the property. Sarah’s father, Joe, had been the legal guardian of his children’s estates, but the great wealth that Sarah accrued from oil royalties prompted a county judge to assign a white man, J.T. Porter, to oversee the girl’s finances. Joe Rector was seemingly stripped of his guardianship for no reason other than the color of his skin. Furthermore, the voices of Sarah and her family members remain largely absent from the testimony and litigation surrounding her estate. However, a handful of reports from probate lawyers and court rooms reveal how the Rectors navigated their circumscribed wealth and maintained a semblance of control over Sarah’s estate amid the oil boom. Joe Rector, who was a farmer, testified before a Muskogee County court that he wanted his daughter’s guardians to purchase a nearby tract of Arkansas River bottom land known as the Fish property. Rector had known the land his entire life and, due to his firsthand knowledge, was confident that the property was capable of producing a bale of cotton per acre, fifty bushels of corn, and two tons of alfalfa each growing season. He was already renting a portion of the property and at work cultivating parts of it and ensured that he would look after the land, make improvements, seek out tenants, and maintain connections with nearby markets. Joe Rector’s request can be viewed as not only an attempt to profit from his daughter’s oil royalties, but also a strategy for sinking stronger roots into the soil in the area surrounding his familial home. At the same time, Joe and Sarah’s guardian both insisted that offering portions of the land to sharecroppers would likely accrue twice as much income for Sarah’s estate as renting it for straight cash. Diversifying oil royalties into other forms of capital placed the Rectors on the winning end of the sharecropping system, one of the Southwest’s most insidious farm-labor regimes. White guardians also used oil wealth to instruct and include Black and Indigenous individuals in webs of debt and to “modernize” their Indigenous and Black Indigenous wards. Sarah could support family members using her royalties, but only in the form of loans entirely controlled by her white guardian. Rector’s estate had accrued $54,000 by mid-1914, of which $46,000 came from oil production. Sarah’s guardian J.T. Porter loaned $42,000 of this total to various parties, including to members of his family and members of the Rector family, at an 8 percent interest rate. A new lease negotiated with Prairie in 1918 garnered the Rector estate another $300,000, which Porter used to loan out mortgages, purchase a 452-acre farm on the Verdigris River near Tulsa, and invest $50,000 in government bonds.25 White officials designed the guardian system in ways that quelled fears that the considerably large payouts that oil leases offered Native landowners would allow kin groups and neighbors to maintain a semblance of communal subsistence, which undermined the ultimate goals of allotment. For instance, Thomas Leahy, a county judge, wrote to the Secretary of the Interior and defended the fact that Sarah obtained only $600 in 1913–1914, arguing that “other members of the family and neighbors” benefited from any cash paid out directly to Sarah more so than she did personally. Leahy’s rationale for limiting payments to Sarah confirmed allotment’s Anglo-American commitment to turning individuals into isolated economic subjects, undermining the Rectors’ ability to support larger networks of kin through Sarah’s oil wealth. Joe and Rose Rector allegedly objected to this norm. In 1914, a probate attorney in Muskogee wrote to Judge R.C. Allen in Washington, D.C., ensuring that Rector’s parents were “of fair intelligence and apparently hard-working, industrious people.” However, while Rose and Joe Rector realized that Sarah’s estate was of “considerable value and that it is a growing estate,” they did not fully embrace the idea that “the estate of their child is to be used wholly for [Sarah’s] personal comfort and advantage.”26 The management of Rector’s estate by white authorities went beyond controlling oil royalties and dictating investments. Guardians and BIA officials also used oil money to transform the daily lives of the Rector family and to physically remove Sarah from her home and eventually from the Creek Nation altogether. With the discovery of oil, Leahy and the guardian “agreed upon certain changes looking toward the betterment of conditions for Sarah and the entire family.” For Leahy, this meant purchasing new furniture and convincing Sarah’s mother to purchase land that would become the site of a new five-room cottage. Eventually, Sarah’s oil wealth proved great enough that white officials, both local and federal, sought out an elite boarding school for her to attend, laying the groundwork for her semipermanent separation from her family and their land. Indeed, she soon matriculated at Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Leahy stated that her parents “strenuously objected to her leaving home at that time, she being but ten years of age.” Sarah used some of her allowance to purchase a phonograph; beyond this, there’s no indication that she purchased any additional personal items or gifts of her own accord.27 Sarah Rector’s wealth resulted in considerable fame in both the white and Black presses. Her background as a person of both African and Indigenous heritage grew increasingly obscured, as both non-Indigenous African Americans and white Americans claimed ownership of her story and her future. In 1913, the Black newspaper Chicago Defender reported that white people “have become so alarmed at the enormous wealth of this young girl” that some wanted to “enamel” her or devise other methods that would allow Rector to pass as white. The paper clearly demonstrated the malleability of race amid the oil booms when it reported that the Oklahoma legislature desired to pass a law declaring Rector a white person. “It’s the same old idea of the white man,” the paper continued, “that whenever a Negro achieves any distinction …some white men want to declare them white.” The Black press took a keen interest in Rector’s personal safety given her growing fame and fortune. Their interest was well warranted given the fate of other oil-rich Black children. For instance, in March of 1911, William Irvin, a prominent white Muskogee landowner, dynamited the home of a Black family in Sarah’s hometown of Taft, intentionally killing two children, Castella and Herbert Sells. Irvin organized the murder of the Sells children in order to gain title to their oil-rich Glenn Pool allotments. Seven men were indicted for the murders, but only Irvin and a Black accomplice who laid the dynamite were convicted.28 While the Black press positioned Sarah as an African American (but not Indigenous) child worthy of protection, the white press situated her as racially unfit to possess such a hydrocarbon inheritance. In 1914, the Kansas City Star described Sarah’s wealth and the oil riches of other Black Creeks with animosity and factual inaccuracies that served to paint Rector as especially backward, placing her beyond the boundaries of social acceptability and declaring her and her race unfit to possess oil wealth. The paper alleged that Sarah and her sister Mannie had become rich through the possession of land inherited from their deceased parents. Sarah’s parents were perfectly alive at the time, but the paper insisted otherwise, painting Sarah as “an orphan, rude, black and uneducated” and “as oblivious to the events of the world as an Eskimo.” This was part of a larger exposé on nonwhites who lucked upon wealth in the oil fields. The paper concluded, “[white] Oklahomans … don’t even stop to wonder at the selections Fortune makes when she picks out little darkies and immigrants on which to shower her wealth.” Oilmen and other white settlers did not consider such money to be “lost,” because non-white owners of oil land “will die, or someone will take it away from them and things will go back just like they were. And probably that is the correct solution of Fortune’s strange caprices.” In the eyes of the white press, Native American and Black wealth was an absurd, unjust coincidence of the oil fields, where immeasurable riches literally gushed from the earth. Many whites believed that the prodigious wealth that modern energy sources beckoned would inevitably and rightfully flow to the top of the racial hierarchy, regardless of the means.29 Conclusion: Oil, the Tulsa Race Massacre, and the Klan Unlike many other “full-blood” and African Creek individuals, Sarah Rector managed to live a life of relative comfort buoyed by her oil royalties. There is reason to believe that this was largely due to her fame, which brought her personal story to the attention of powerful African American activists, including Washington and W.E.B DuBois, who revealed her plight under Oklahoma’s guardian system to a national audience of civil rights proponents. She and her family moved to Kansas City in 1917 where she remained throughout most of her adulthood. Rector owned real estate in the city, continued to earn royalties from oil production, and operated a car dealership. She owned a “stable of Cadillacs and Lincolns” and was reportedly a fan of joyriding around the city, especially in large, gas-guzzling automobiles. In this way, petroleum both financed Rector’s wealth and fueled the freedoms that she practiced through that wealth. For so many others in Rector’s position, the fact remained that both **cultures of racism and a color-bounded regime of property administered by whites resulted in alienation, dispossession, and violent death. The violence surrounding petroleum and non-white people’s property culminated in the 1921 Tulsa race massacre.** While historians have revealed how the destruction of the Black neighborhood of Greenwood—known as “Black Wall Street”—at the hands of white rioters unfolded, few have made more than tangential connections between the massacre and Tulsa’s status as the so-called Oil Capital of the World.30 The attack on Greenwood commenced on May 31, following dubious accusations made by a young white woman that a Black elevator operator had assaulted her. However, the problems of oil wealth’s caprices simmered beneath the surface as white mobs gathered on the late-spring day. Tulsa, a major center of refining and oil-industry finance, was suffering from an oil depression at the time. A fall in prices following the end of World War I, a lack of new petroleum discoveries in Oklahoma, and the steady exhaustion of once-fecund oil tracts such as the Thlocco and Rector leases all plagued the city and surrounding rural areas. The lack of oil production further harmed landowners, who would have welcomed mineral royalties amid the growing postwar agricultural downturn. The relative economic prosperity of some Black residents only heightened the possibility of white resentment and violence. In the aftermath of the massacre, journalists and activists sympathetic to the cause of Black civil rights pointed to African American successes within the oil industry as a primary spark in initiating the white attack on Black Tulsa. James Weldon Johnson, the executive secretary of the NAACP in 1921, argued that oil fueled racial animosities in the runup to the massacre. He cited instances of Black landowners around Tulsa discovering rich oil reserves on their properties and, “because no white man would bore for them,” being forced to sell their land “at the white man’s price.” John Haynes Holmes, a white man who helped found both the NAACP and the ACLU, relayed the story of a Black family from Clearview, a community outside of Tulsa, who refused to sell their oil-rich farm despite the demands of their white neighbors. Soon after, the family of five was killed when an unknown arsonist burned down their home. For many Black Americans and their white supporters eager to assess the causes of the massacre, it was clear: if petroleum had precipitated these acts of violence, then it likely played a role in Greenwood’s destruction as well.31 The efforts of Wash Hudson and white oilmen to establish and strengthen the Ku Klux Klan in the wake of the Tulsa massacre was echoed across Oklahoma’s petroleum fields, where white-supremacist mobilizing was especially rampant. Oil towns proved to be ripe territory for migrant, non-white laborers and union activities, as well as the subsequent perception among many whites of rampant crime and vice. As a result, white vigilantism flourished in these areas. One white resident of Muskogee County, where Rector and her family lived, celebrated Klan vigilantism and concluded that white-supremacist action “certainly was born of great necessity in this oil country.” In Oilton, the boomtown adjacent to the Thlocco and Rector allotments, the local Klan built a regional headquarters that became a meeting place for several klaverns in northeast Oklahoma. One historian estimates that, among the five thousand residents of Oilton’s neighboring town of Quay, upwards of half were Klansmen during the early 1920s.32 This influx of white-supremacist power in the backyards of Indigenous and Black Indigenous allottees represented the aftermath of oil’s tumultuous rise to the top of regional and national imaginaries about race, property, and wealth. **For many whites, vigilante violence was the necessary response to the numerous threats to their oil inheritance that arose via “outside” monopolies, unfit Indigenous property owners, and recalcitrant Black people.** When white Americans emphasized the “windfall” that nonwhite peoples received due to oil abundance, they insisted upon a story of white settlement exempt from the ugly side of colonial dispossession and white-supremacist violence. Native peoples had been compensated, they suggested, and whatever happened afterward was simply confirmation of Indigenous people’s unreadiness for “civilization” and self governance. The story was the same for Black people, who had further provoked white backlash by flaunting their wealth in cities such as Tulsa. And when white people insisted upon the transfer of fossil-fuel wealth from “incompetent” Indians and African Indians to white guardians, they elided questions of power and injustice by invoking the assumed efficacy of law and bureaucratic oversight. Petroleum’s vexations—its great energy density accompanied by its unpredictable occurrence and habit of falling into seemingly unworthy hands—drove these cultural and institutional commitments to white supremacy in Indian Territory and Oklahoma

#### Throughout history, there have been ways that the narrative of settlerism has been ruptured: Indigenous activists in the American Indian movement putting the USFG and government officials on trial for violence inflicted on natives. Natives have reclaimed spaces of social perception by spray-painting and writing over statues of historical representations of the government like Columbus and Teddy Roosevelt. This Affective action disrupted settler norms and flipped core presence.

#### Therefore, we call for an affective rupture of the resolution. Actively moving to unsettle settler comfortability and innocence is the only way to interrupt the violent research curriculum of debate and position our personal orientations actively against settler colonialism.

#### We reconfigure our relationships to the resolution and debate writ-large through an affective, rather than a mechanistic, process in order to create spaces within debate through which we can dismantle our emotional complicity with settler colonialism

Barker and Lowman 16 [Adam J. Barker University of Leicester, Emma Battell Lowman University of Hertfordshire. *The Limits of Settler Colonial Reconciliation Non-Indigenous People and the Responsibility to Engage,* Chapter 12: The Spaces of Dangerous Freedom: Disrupting Settler Colonialism]

In order to assist Indigenous resurgence movements, Settler people have to encourage the failure of their own sovereign regimes. And it is here, in failure, that there is some inspiration to be found in how Settler people can make a positive contribution. Judith Halberstam (2011) explores the idea of ‘failure’—to meet 4 This is in reference to Haiven and Khasnabish discussion of neoliberal austerity as limiting the ability of radical movements to envision futures beyond struggles against these systems (2014). 198 A.J. Barker and E. Battell Lowman dominant norms and expectations, to experiment with different ways of seeing and being in the world even if they are not sustainable—as a necessary corrective to the unattainable ‘success’ of neoliberal inclusion. Likewise, as Settler people who do not want the settler colonial project to succeed, we must practice ‘failing’ as Settler people in order to disrupt settler colonial spaces. As Halberstam notes, this ideology of failure ‘turns on the impossible, the improbable, the unlikely, and the unremarkable. It quietly loses, and in losing it imagines other goals for life, for love… and for being’ (2011: 88). This is what we hope to do: to fail to uphold settler colonial relationships, to fail to properly inhabit and embody settler colonial structures, systems, and stories, and by necessity find ways to build relationships differently. We cannot change who we are as Settler people alone, so we must work to create a broad base, to build communities that undertake these efforts together. This experimentation runs counter to everything on which settler colonial Canadian society is premised, which means it is and will be opposed. So, if we want to be other than settler colonisers, we have to collectively struggle to change, in order to ‘fail’ to conform to settler colonial norms. And in so doing, we open up the possibility of worlds beyond those norms, of something beyond the hope of Settler success.

Our call to centralise the principle ‘Always in Relationship’ in Settler decolonisation struggles (Battell Lowman and Barker 2015: 116–120) recognises that Settler people and Indigenous people are always already in relationship. However, at present these relationships are heavily influenced by colonial power, resulting in colonial spaces being built around and through the act of relating. Indigeneity is often equated with a kind of tribalism that threatens the belonging of recently arrived settlers (Coleman 2016), and also runs against deep seated settler colonial fears of frontier violence (Morgensen 2011). These existential fears and structural diversions mean that Indigenous-Settler relationships are enacted at large, macro scales and rarely reach the more intimate scales of personal interaction in a meaningful or self-critical way.5 A direct result of this structural dependency is a social deferral of responsibility for relating to Indigenous peoples and nations to an institutional scale, seen as more appropriate to treat the social ‘sickness’ of indigeneity. This creates a double-bind: Settler individuals and groups see Indigenous people as a ‘national’ responsibility and thus something that should not impact on their lives, even as the federal government works to divest itself of responsibility for Indigenous communities.

Settler colonial relationships between Indigenous and Settler peoples—and by extension, between Settler peoples and the land—have proven incredibly resilient to educational intervention, media critique, or political recognition and rights-based protections (Coulthard 2014). Likewise, as a variety of scholars have critically described, even (radical) activists with robust analyses and critiques of colonial hierarchy (Barker and Pickerill 2012; Lagalisse 2011), and respect for spiritual and cultural connections that exist outside the Western paradigm (Watts 2013), have repeatedly failed to relate to Indigenous peoples and lands in respectful ways. Knowing that settler colonialism exists, that it is entangled with state violence and capitalist dehumanisation and oppression, and even that settler societies like Canada remain actively engaged in erasure and dispossession of Indigenous peoples does not necessarily correlate to the creation of anticolonial and decolonising relationships of solidarity. Decolonisation, by contrast, has to be about changing relationships and making them healthy, supportive, and safe, not just in spite of colonial power, but actively against it (Hunt and Holmes 2015).

Decolonising relationships to both people and places must be approached in an affective rather than a mechanistic manner (Barker 2013). As such, Settler people cannot necessarily ‘think’ their way out of settler colonialism: the attachments to institutions of power and privilege and narratives of superior culture and knowledge are almost unavoidable pitfalls to this approach (Tuck and Yang 2012: 19–22; Mihesuah and Wilson 2004; Smith 1999). Settler research and knowledge production can be anticolonial (Battell Lowman 2014; Lewis 2012), but instances of this are usually the result of prior relationship-building. Instead of pursuing another intellectualised pathway to decolonisation, wherein Settler people attempt to rationalise their way through settler colonialism, complicity, anti-colonialism and decolonisation, we believe that reconfiguring relationships must be premised on the creation of spaces that encourage pre-cognitive, emotional engagements with personal and collective settler colonial complicity. We cannot expect to simply ‘act differently together’ in any successful or sustainable manner without recognising that, even when we are physically together, we are not occupying the same spatialities. Settler and Indigenous peoples are, in effect, always on ‘uncommon ground,’ but as Paul Chatterton has argued, understanding that we literally occupy different conceptual spaces does not the prevent forging of different kinds of relationships between those spaces (Chatterton 2006)

How do we create the conditions for this sort of affective rupture and ‘unsettle’ in a way that sustains the embodied change of state associated with affective responses that precede decolonising solidarity work? Decolonisation, as a social project, must simultaneously denormalise this settler colonial ontology and disrupt the material functioning of settler colonial extraction, appropriation and erasure of Indigenous peoples. The only way to generate a persistent, affective state is to continually confound material privilege and perceived benefits of being Settler (Battell Lowman and Barker 2015), such that Settler people are forced to consider what 200 A.J. Barker and E. Battell Lowman Memmi has called the inconceivable (1965)

#### We need a “hermeneutics of suspicion” to address debate’s current research paradigm that emerges from “civil” and “procedural” protocols – as settlers, we have a responsibility to force debate to reckon with the histories of genocide. Affective Rupture renders transparent the settler colonial metanarrative that underlies the abstracted knowledge of “neutral” instrumental propositions. Our method unravels respectable social science research that masquerades as “rigorous” and “productive” engagement

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of MaryLand at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1, footnotes 1 and 7 included in curly braces, modified, pg. 162-165)

The distinguishing ethical concerns and dilemmas of both Native/Indigenous decolonization and Black abolition inevitably alter and destabilize the ground on which discussions about identity and specifically the human unfold. How these political and intellectual projects change the terms of the debate and discussion about identity and the human are invaluable to the project of critical ethnic studies. Scholars in the fields of critical ethnic, Black, and Native studies who welcome the charge of decolonization and abolition in the corporate university often labor to push back against and expose the limitations of the “epistemic turns” or “epistemic revolutions of Europe” that Sylvia Wynter so deftly tracks in her voluminous body of work. Scholars committed to the politics of Black abolitionist work and Native decolonization must often assume postures of suspicion— “misanthropy”— and sometimes must outright refuse Western thought’s arrogant universalist assumptions, commonsense tautologies, and professed reforms to the category of the human; due to these ways, they often experience a great deal of hostility and violence. When decolonial and Black abolitionist thought has to contend with Western or European continental theory, specifically its critical theories of progressive (liberal) social change, one often encounters an epistemic crisis or what scholar Frank Wilderson refers to as an antagonism.1

Forced to wrestle with antagonisms that often require Native/Indigenous and Black death, the scholar committed to decolonization and abolition in the university seminar space often has to refuse necropolitical epistemological systems, which structure white liberal humanist ways of thinking and imagining the world. This kind of labor and violent confrontation in the classroom on a repeated basis can transform one’s educational and professional experience into one rife with stress, anxiety, and unease. More specifically, I have watched graduate students of color experience this kind of stress, anxiety, and unease as they confront the pressure to “take up” more contemporary impulses within Western “critical theory” to move “beyond the human” or toward the posthuman. One task of this article is to attend to the ways that Black and Indigenous academics, as well as Black and Native studies scholars, are expected to perform a commitment to a Deleuzian brand of posthumanist and nonrepresentational theory as proof that they are critical and postmodern scholars and disciplinary formations. Lately, I have heard questions posed to Black and Native scholars and activists who theorize the work of movements like Black Lives Matter, Idle No More, and other work addressing Black and Indigenous death to explain what relationship this (survival- based) work has to “identity,” “the subject,” or “the human.” More specifically, the questions are posed as ones that assume that these movements reify one or all of the above categories. Additionally, the inquiries are accompanied by an expectation that the person(s) and the movements will disavow all claims to identity, subjecthood, and the desire for humanity.

What kinds of hostilities, assumptions, and misrecognitions lurk in inquiries such as the following: “Is Black Lives Matter a humanist movement?”2 “Does BLM reify the notion and idea of the human?” “When will Native studies transcend or get beyond the subject or the human?”3 Because emerging scholars in the academy often contend with these hostile inquires in the seminar space, while teaching, at conferences and in other spaces of academe, a change in comportment, tone, affect, and ways of being in the academy also needs to accompany the modes of conceptual and theoretical resistance within Black and Native studies. This article is as interested in the postures, affective states (skepticism), and stubborn practices of insubordination such as refusal that frustrate forward movement and business- asusual in the academy. Specifically, this article tracks how Native feminist refusal and Black feminist suspicion respond to Deleuzian theory Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways. First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse. Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. The particular manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important. The force, break with decorum, and style in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, identity is already taken up in this discussion. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 Further, I discuss “decolonial refusal” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self- )professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions. In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other.9 Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 Wynter understands that one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself. I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self- critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies. Like Wynter, the field of Black studies has consistently made the liberal human an object of study and scrutiny, particularly the nefarious manner in which it violently produces Black existence as other than and at times nonhuman. Wynter’s empirical method of tracking the internal epistemic crises and revolutions of Europe from the outside has functioned as a model for one way that Black studies can unfurl a critique of the human as well as Western modes of thought. I use the terms “misanthropy” and “misandry” in this article to evoke how Black studies has remained attentive to, wary about, and deeply distrustful of the human condition, humankind, and the humanas- man/men in the case of Black “feminists.” Both Black studies’ distrust of the “human” and Black feminism’s distrust of humanism in its version as man/men (which at times seeks to incorporate Black men) relentlessly scrutinize how the category of the human and in this case the “posthuman” reproduce Black death. I link misandry (skepticism of humankind- as- man) to the kind of skepticism and “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Black feminist scholars like Wynter, Jackson, and Musser at times apply to their reading and engagement with revisions to or expansions of the category of the human, posthuman discourses, and nonrepresentational theory. In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra- European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human. In fact, Black and Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human.

#### This results in a re-thinking of thinking that problematizes spatial logics of objective mastery – language has MATERIAL manifestations for minorities finding a place in the debate space

**Marzec 1** (Robert, Teaches Postcolonial Studies @ SUNY Fredonia, An Anatomy of Empire, symploke 9.1-2 (2001))

Given the customary academic impulse to incorporate new works along disciplinary lines, it is important to stress the assiduous manner in which America's Shadow actively defies categorization as "theoretical," "literary," or "postcolonial" in focus (or even as a fashionable “inter-disciplinary" combination of each of these). Its search through multiple registers - current American politics, the event of Vietnam, American foundations in Puritanism, the Enlightenment's reorganization of reality, the Roman colonization of Greek thinking - and its consideration of the efforts of scholars such as Jacques Derrida, Fredric Jameson, Mary Louise Pratt, and Edward W. Said to come to terms with these shifting economies of reality, offers an act of criticism that defies classification. Resisting the enactment of an orthodoxy, America's Shadow can best be thought of as an ontological archive of the current world order. Retrieving crucial foundational shifts in history that determine the order of existence in our present marks the first aspect of this archival study of empire, or, to use Spanos's term, "anatomy." The second involves the interrogation of not only accepted discourses, but cutting-edge movements of critical thought as well, an aspect of scholarship that good cautious scholars take as a principal charge. In the work of Edward Said, for instance, Spanos traces a movement of thought that inadvertently leads to a major oversight in the field of postcolonial criticism empowered by Said's insights. Fleshing out the influence of colonization along the full continuum of being, Spanos throws into relief the repercussions of Said's emphasis on geopolitical imperialism and subsequent failure to give full weight to the ontological origins of occidental imperialism. This gesture enables Spanos to reveal the extent to which the relay of imperial ideologies is enabled by a centuries-long colonization of the notion of "truth" itself, a colonization governed by a logic of mastery that stems from Imperial Rome and that "derives from thinking being meta-ta-physica ["above," "beyond," or "outside" things in contextual, temporal flux]." Similarly, Spanos finds it highly disabling that critics have come to take Foucault's emphasis on the period of the Enlightenment as evidence for concluding this moment in history to be a "mutation" in thinking resulting in Western Imperialism proper." Consequently, postcolonial theory in general heedlessly contributes to a failure to consider the full jurisdiction of imperialism. The widespread impulse to emphasize the period of the Enlightenment as if it were the cradle of true imperial practices is symptomatic of the very disciplinarity that Foucault calls into question. This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal” the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism, and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America. In constructing his counter-memory archive, Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking. The early Greek thinking of being as temporal and groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) undergoes a hardening process that results in the colonization of lived events for purposes of intellectual manipulation: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); the agonistic Greek understanding of truth as chletheia is annulled in favor of the Roman circumscription of truth as correctness (veritas). More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly consi- dered. Thinking, he reveals, has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited" (191). This change naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and the antagonism offered by the heterogeneity disseminated by the movement of temporality is re- presented as a problem to be surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191). The power of this triumph of instrumentalist thinking lies in its ability to throw all foundational inquiry into oblivion. In its ubiquity, this instrumentality affects the very people attempting to offer opposition to the dominant order, for within the problematic of contemporary criticism, one is either characterized as engaging in a form of "high theory" that uses a language that fails to speak to the world at large, or one resists by taking "real political action." Thus, ontological analyses are doubly ostracized. This constitutes an incredible handicap to oppositional thinking in the post-Cold War era. Spanos writes: [F]or an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking - the "shadow" that haunts its light- that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the margin- alized intellectual is the re- thinking of thinking itself ... [I] t is the event of the Vietnam War- and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it- that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

#### Debate is first and foremost a site of subject formation. In light of this, we must center the centuries-long genocidal structure that forms how we think and exist. The Affirmative’s intervention is essential to destabilize the settler psyche that otherwise coheres itself by pushing this violence out of the picture. Anything else sustains the ongoing violence of dispossession

Henderson 15 [Prof. of political science @ University of Victoria, Phil, ‘Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism,’ Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement – modified so “Land” is capitalized]

Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, **settlers must answer the** legitimate **charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon** the privileges produced by **ongoing genocide.** The jarring nature of **such charges offer**s **an irreconcilable challenge** to settlers qua settlers.64 Should **these charges** become impossible to ignore, they **threaten to explode** the imago of settler colonialism, which had hitherto operated within **the settler psyche** in a relatively smooth and benign manner. This explosion is potentiated **by the revelation of** even a portion of the **violence** that is **required to make settler life possible.** If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ **the subject experiences** a sense of **enormous vulnerability.**66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment', the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown's thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening'.68 This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism's imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that **settlers are** also **always already** in a **psychically defensive** position – that is, the settler's offensive position on occupied Land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, **the** attendant **desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates** the **suppression** of both desires, **if the subject's reliance on settler** colonial **power** structure **is to be psychically naturalized.** Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, **this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession**; as such, **settlers** often **suggest that they** aim to **create a ‘city on the hill’.**70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts'. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire's energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, **this** obsession at once **solidifies the power of the** settler **state, thereby naturalizing the settler and** simultaneously perpetuating the processes of **erasing indigenous peoples.** Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of arrested development between these defensive positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that **decolonization must include an analysis of the** dominant ‘self-disciplining **colonial subject**’.73 However, as **this discussion** of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies **must** also examine and **cultivate the** ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the **instability at the core of the settler subject**, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, **the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized** as others might suggest.75 Because of **this precarity**, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also **provides an avenue by which** the process of **settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider.** Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 **The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and** thus to **destabilize settler subjects.** **Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments** like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 **it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices**, presences, **and speech acts.** Goeman correctly observes that **the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’** are what **give settler spaces their meaning**, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, **to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is** at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also **to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject.** Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. **While such practices may not overthrow the** settler colonial **system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples** who refuse erasure.

#### We also have examples affect in debate – the resolution intrinsically assumes the governments existence as inevitable and a part of reality we should accept. Debate assumes that the genocide project has been completed. Extinction scenarios through nuclear war and util rhetoric normalizes the investment and legitimacy of the government – the resolution solidifies the idea that the USFG has an ethical right to exist. Only the affirmative can rupture these notions because it replaces conversations of the USFG with native scholarship and the resolutions relationship to colonialism.

#### Debate shouldn’t script who students can become – the Affirmative is essential to activate the potential of debaters to resist settler colonialism

Carroll & Gaztambide-Fernández 16 [Shawna, University of Toronto, Toronto with expertise in Qualitative Social Research and Rubén, Associate Professor Department of Curriculum, Teaching and Learning Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at The University of Toronto. “Youth subjectification and resistance in the settler state.” Pages 343-347 | Published online: 13 Sep 2016]

Gacoin concludes that **who youth are cannot be scripted** or predetermined and that educators should examine “how **a more structured pedagogical approach risks becoming a violent closure of the very possibility of engaging differently with one another** within the pedagogical encounter” (p. 421). The idea that youth can be targeted through sexuality education simplifies complex identities and erases differences along categories of race, class, and gender, for instance, assuming instead a coherent, stable, and neoliberal youth subject. Here, we see clear overlaps between the four articles, as each sheds light on the power of contemporary discourses to shape youth subjectivities. Yet, all four authors also point to the possibilities of **resistance against normative ideologies that prescribe who youth ought to be**. This **is crucial if we are to connect such analyses to the ongoing resistance efforts of various activist groups.** Within activist spaces, **white settler colonial ideology** is increasingly becoming the object of explicit analyses as an oppressive force that **continues to reinforce dominant hierarchies. Much like** the **dominant discourses that shape youth subjectivities within schools, the settler colonial state** also **produces laws** and policies **that regulate who does or does not count as a proper citizen.** In Canada, as **in** other **settler states**, this **regulation often occurs under the guise of protecting the public,** for instance, through laws like Bill C-51, or the “Anti-terrorism Act.” **While ostensibly about protecting the public, such laws frame who is allowed to organize on behalf of social justice efforts as well as who is construed as a proper citizen, which has major consequences for activists of colour involved in justice efforts.** These acts of protectionism are intimately linked to a multicultural narrative in which the idealized citizen is construed as “tolerant” through a contrast to an imagined “Other” who must be properly positioned (and controlled) within a white settler colonial framework in order to reinforce colonial orders of power. **This settler colonial ideology**, as the articles in the issues suggest, also **shapes the subject positions available to young people in ways that are always-already embedded within the white settler colonial ideology of white innocence.** This line of analysis has led to the emergence of strong connections of solidarity between movements such as Black Lives Matter and Idle No More, as activists come to recognize the ways in which settler colonialism shapes the experiences of various marginalized groups. Recently, for example, following the suicides in the Cree community of Attawapiskat, Black Lives Matter activists joined the Idle No More movement in their occupation of Indigenous and Northern Affairs offices across Canada to demand action over the water, housing and suicide crises that affect Indigenous communities (Da Silva, 2016 Da Silva, C. (2016, April 13). Idle No More, Black Lives Matter protesters demand action on Attawapiskat suicide crisis. CBC News Toronto. These **analyses are** also **generating not only sophisticated critiques, but** also **significant movements against major institutions.** From the critique of whiteness in the movie industry and the boycott of the Oscars (Gordon, 2016 Gordon, M. S. (2016). The cult of whiteness: On #OscarsSoWhite, Donald Trump, and the end of America. Windy City Times, 31(21), 1–11. ), to the uprisings in host cities like Rio de Janeiro against the devastating impacts of the “roving colonization” brought by the Olympic and Paralympic Games (Sykes, in press) Sykes, H. (in press). The sexual and gender politics of sport mega-events: Roving colonialism. New York: Routledge. , critiques of white settler colonialism are generating new movements and alliances. **Young people are playing a central and significant role** in these movements, **despite the ways in which educational institutions have attempted to delimit who they can become and how they enact their youth subjectivities.** Indeed, to the extent that educational institutions delimit who youth can become, as the four articles in this issue demonstrate, **we should be intrigued by the phenomenal role that youth are playing in social movements and their immense potential for imagining futures otherwise.**

#### Lack of creative process approaches makes debate a monoculture – their standards for how education in debate should operate are Eurocentric.

Baker 8 (Michael, U Rochester, Eurocentrism and the Modern/Colonial Curriculum: Towards a Post-Eurocentric Math & Science Education – A Critical Interpretive Review, http://www.academia.edu/1517810/Towards\_a\_Post-Eurocentric\_Math\_and\_Science\_Education\_--\_A\_Critical\_Interpretive\_Review)

Every conception of the “world” involves epistemological and ontological presuppositions interrelated with particular (historical and cultural) ways of knowing and being. All forms of knowledge uphold practices and constitute subjects (Santos, 2007a).What counts as knowledge and what it means to be human are profoundly interrelated(Santos, 2006). The knowledge that counts in the modern school curriculum, from kindergarten to graduate school, is largely constructed and contained within an epistemic framework that is constitutive of the monocultural worldview and ideological project of western modernity (Meyer, Kamens & Benavot, 1992; Wallerstein, 1997, 2006; Lander,2002; Kanu, 2006; Kincheloe, 2008; Battiste, 2008). The monocultural worldview and ethos of western civilization are based in part upon structures of knowledge and an epistemic framework elaborated and maintained within a structure of power/knowledge relations involved in five hundred years of European imperial/colonial domination(Quijano, 1999, p. 47). If our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is also to become more and not less democratic, schools and teachers must learn to incorporate the worldwide diversity of knowledges and ways of being (multiple epistemologies and ontologies) occluded by the hegemony of Eurocentrism. Academic knowledge and understanding should be complemented with learning from those who are living in and thinking from colonial and postcolonial legacies (Mignolo, 2000, p. 5).Too many children and adults today (particularly those from non-dominant groups)continue to be alienated and marginalized within modern classrooms where knowledge and learning are unconsciously permeated by this imperial/colonial conception of the world. The reproduction of personal and cultural inferiority inherent in the modern educational project of monocultural assimilation is interrelated with the hegemony of western knowledge structures that are largely taken for granted within Eurocentric education (Dei,2008). Thus, in the field of education, “we need to learn again how five centuries of studying, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up and to educate the world” (Willinsky,1998, pp. 2-3). The epistemic and conceptual apparatus through which the modern world was divided up and modern education was institutionalized is located in the cultural complex called “Eurocentrism”. Western education institutions and the modern curriculum, from the sixteenth century into the present, were designed to reproduce this Eurocentric imaginary under the sign of “civilization” (Grafton & Jardine, 1986; Butts, 1967, 1973). Eurocentric knowledge lies at the center of an imperial and colonial model of civilization that now threatens to destroy the conditions that make life possible (Lander, 2002, p. 245). From a post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon (described below), the present conditions of knowledge are embedded within a hegemonic knowledge apparatus that emerged with European colonialism and imperialism in the sixteenth century (Philopose, 2007;Kincheloe, 2008).Based upon hierarchical competition for power, control, and supremacy among the“civilized” nation-states, imperialism is an original and inherent characteristic of the modern western interstate system that emerged with the formation of sovereign European territorial states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wallerstein, 1973; Gong, 1984 ;Hindness, 2005; Agnew, 2003; Taylor & Flint, 2000). Closely interrelated with imperialism,

colonialism

involves a civilizing project within an ideological formation established to construct the way the world is known and understood, particularly through the production, representation, and organization of knowledge (Mignolo, 2000a; Kanu,2006). Colonialism reduces reality to the single dimension of the colonizer. Colonialism and imperialism impose on the world one discourse, one form of conscience, one science, one way of being in the world. “Post-colonial analysis leads to a simple realization: that the effect of the colonizing process over individuals, over culture and society throughout Europe’s domain was vast, and produced consequences as complex as they are profound”(Ashcroft, 2001a, p. 24).

In yet to be acknowledged ways, the Eurocentric curriculum, and western schooling in general, are profoundly interrelated with both modern imperialism and colonialism.

The persistence and continuity of Eurocentrism rather leads one to see it asa part of a habitus of imperial subjectivity that manifests itself in a particular kind of attitude”: the European attitude – a subset of a more encompassing “imperial attitude.” The Eurocentric attitude combines the search for *theoria* with the mythical fixation with roots and the assertion of imperial subjectivity. It produces and defends what Enrique Dussel has referred to as “the myth of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres, 2005b, p. 43).

Western schooling reproduces this “Eurocentric attitude” in complicity with a globalizedsystem of power/knowledge relations, tacitly based upon white heterosexual malesupremacy (Kincheloe, 1998; Allen, 2001; Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006; Twine & Gallagher,2008; Akom, 2008a, 2008b). Eurocentrism is a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that relies on confusion between abstract universality and concrete world hegemony (Escobar, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 1999, 2000). Worldwide imperial expansion and European colonialism led to the late nineteenth century world wide hegemony of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2005, p. 56). Eurocentrism, in other words, refers to the hegemony of a (universalized) Euro-Anglo-American epistemological framework that governs both the production and meanings of knowledges and subjectivities throughout the world (Schott, 2001; Kincheloe, 2008).Eurocentrism is an epistemological model that organizes the state, the economy, gender and sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge (Quijano, 2000). The production of Eurocentrism is maintained in specific political, economic, social and cultural institutions and institutionalized practices that began to emerge with the colonization of the Americas in the sixteenth century. The nation-state, the bourgeois family, the capitalist corporation, Eurocentric rationality, and western educational institutions are all examples of world wide institutions and institutionalized practices that contribute to the production of Eurocentrism(Quijano, 2008, pp. 193-194).

Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood without reference to the structures of power that Euro America produced over the last five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized its effects, and universalized its historical claims. Those structures of power include the economic (capitalism, capitalist property relations, markets and modes of production, imperialism, etc.) the political (a system of nation-states, and the nation-form, most importantly, new organizations to handle problems presented by such a reordering of the world, new legal forms, etc.), the social (production of classes, genders, races, ethnicities, religious forms as well as the push toward individual-based social forms), and cultural (including new conceptions of space and time, new ideas of the good life, and a new developmentalist conception of the life-world) (Dirlik,1999, p. 8).

Eurocentric thinking is embedded in the concepts and categories through which the modern world has been constructed. “The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behavior; law, tradition and community; reason, mathematics and science; what Is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence” (Sardar, 1999, p. 44).The mostly taken-for-granted definitions and conceptual boundaries of the academic disciplines and school subjects such as “philosophy”, “math”, “science”, “history”, “literature”, “literacy”, “humanities”, “education” are all Eurocentric constructions

#### Reformist accommodations are gifts of death that reaffirm the generative structures of settler colonialism

Coulthard 13 [Glen, Dene activist, professor of First Nations Studies and Political Science at University of British Columbia, “Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition,’” 23 Mar 2013, <http://www.newsocialist.org/685-indigenous-peoples-and-the-politics-of-recognition> – modified so “Land” is capitalized]

Fanon’s insights here immediately expose the limits of the politics of recognition for restructuring indigenous-state relations in Canada. This project has largely been conceived of in terms of **reformist** state redistribution **schemes like granting** certain **“cultural rights” and concessions to indigenous communities through self-government and Land claims** processes. Although this approach **may alter some** of the **effects of** colonial-capitalist **exploitation** and domination, **it does little to address their generative structures** – in this case the racist capitalist economy and **the colonial state.** Seen from this angle, the contemporary **politics of recognition** simply **leaves** one of **the** two **operative levels of colonial power** identified by Fanon **untouched.**

The second key problem with the politics of recognition’s proposed remedy for colonial injustice has to do with the subjective realm of colonial power. Here it is important to note that most recognition-based proposals – whether we’re talking about the recommendations of Charles Taylor or the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples – **rests on the assumption that the flourishing of indigenous peoples as distinct and self-determining agents is dependent on their being granted** recognition and **institutional accommodation** by and **within the settler-state apparatus.** As sociologist Richard Day has put it, under these models, **recognition is conceived of as a “gift” bestowed from a superior identity to an inferior one.**

## 2AC

#### Our criticism has to be informed by our situatedness within the academy and as produced colonialists – we use the 1AC against these colonial powers

**paperson 17.** La, also K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego. “A Third University Is Possible” June 2017.

This book is further informed by my perspectives as a North American settler “of color,” a university professor, and also a community school founder and teacher and organizer within the contradictory apparatuses of public schools and school reform organisms. **My position is impossible, a colonialistby- product of empire, with decolonizing desires. I am**, and maybe you are too, **a produced colonialist. I am also a by-product of colonization. As a colonialist scrap, I desire against the assemblage that made me.**[20] **This impossibility motivates this analysis**, which seeks not to resolve colonialist dilemmas but to acknowledge that they **include specific machined privileges that may be put to work in the service of decolonizations.** A **recognition of impossibility means to theorize contingently**—that is, **my thinking is temporary**; my right to think aloud is contingent on the apparatus of legitimated colonial knowledge production that ought to be abolished. **Theorizing contingently is not to take the ultimate position on what is possible, nor even the penultimate, but rather to commit to analyses that make space for Indigenous sovereign work, to commit to making room for Black and queer thought.** This requires refusing to give away too much of what I’ve overheard or what I think I know. It involves limiting the extrapolations of my analyses. I hope to make room for you. May you find some spots in these passages that generate directions for your project. A landing pad, a way station, a taking-off point for your broomstick—that’s my goal.